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Preventive Use of Force: The Case of Iraq 
STEPHEN SAWYER:* 
¶1 Ladies and gentlemen, I am Steve Sawyer.  I am the General Counsel of the Center 
for International Human Rights and Adjunct Professor of Law here at the law school and 
am serving as a moderator on this panel which is entitled, “The Preventive Use of Force 
in the Case of Iraq.”  I am going to make some brief remarks and then introduce you to 
the panel and the panel will address you. 
¶2 Through your reading of the brochure and the High-Level Panel Report and to 
some degree the remarks of earlier speakers, you have been introduced to the UN Charter 
standards relating to the lawful and legitimate use of armed force by one nation or a 
collectivity of nations against another nation. 
¶3 The Panel Report talks about two bases under the Charter for the use of such force, 
and I am not going to go into that much detail.  Our speakers are primed to do that. 
¶4 The issue for this panel’s discussion is the appropriateness – the legality, as well as 
the legitimacy – under the UN Charter standards of the use of force by the United States 
and its partners in invading the sovereign nation of Iraq last year. 
¶5 As we have seen in the extensive writing in the field as well as in some of the 
discussion that we heard today, a question raised in some quarters is whether in today’s 
world these UN Charter standards still represent international law, and whether the UN is 
the right vehicle through which standards governing the use of force by one sovereign 
nation against another should be enforced. 
¶6 On this point, Professor Michael Glennon who was to appear here today but was 
unable at the last minute to do so, said flat out or wrote flat out, when asked about the 
legality of the Iraq War, that that war was not unlawful because “there was no 
international law governing use of force.”1  And as we are well aware, and as I am certain 
we will hear, there are many commentators who sharply challenge this proposition. 
¶7 Another issue that I suspect will be the focus of today’s discussion is whether as a 
matter of plain reality or realpolitik, if you will, major threats to peace and humanitarian 
disasters simply cannot and will not be effectively addressed unless and until there is the 
support and participation of the great power nations, and that the UN and other world 
bodies, so it is said, are largely irrelevant to this process. 
¶8 This thinking is exemplified by an article that appeared recently in the Op-Ed page 
of The New York Times where a professor at the University of Chicago, Eric Posner, said 
that successful international organizations either adapt to world power or they “wither on 
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the vine.”2  This view too, as I am sure we will hear and as we have heard, is sharply 
contested.  Put more simply, when the chips are down, can we expect that powerful 
nations will take the necessary actions, unilaterally if necessary, to preserve their self-
interests, and that they will take these actions unrestrained by international law or by 
international organs like the UN? 
¶9 Put even more simply, as was suggested by an earlier speaker, given what we are 
seeing on the world scene today, including what was said most recently in the election 
campaign of this country: has the world really changed since the days of Chancellor 
Bismarck? 
¶10 I am sure from the different perspectives of our speakers, answers to these 
questions and others will emerge in forceful fashion, and I want now to turn the 
discussion over to our speakers. 
¶11 First, to my immediate left, Henry Bienen, the President of Northwestern 
University.  Next to him, Ambassador Feisal Istrabadi, the Deputy Permanent 
Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, and at the far end, Jan Wouters, professor 
with the faculty of law at the University of Leuven in Belgium. 
¶12 So I now turn the discussion over to them. 
HENRY BIENEN :** 
¶13 Thank you. 
¶14 I should say in starting that although this is an academic conference, my views here 
are my own, not the university’s.  The university president seems to get in trouble at 
conferences, but I will not be talking about gender at all today. 3 
¶15 In any case – and I should preface my final preface to my remarks – we had the 
honor of having Secretary-General Annan as our commencement speaker a couple of 
years ago, and it really was a great honor indeed for the university. 
¶16 That said, I will now talk about the issues of American intervention in Iraq.  First, I 
should point out what maybe is obvious: between what has come to be called the First 
Gulf War and Second Gulf War, America had been intervening in Iraq.  There was no 
cessation of American intervention in Iraq.  We continued to have fly-overs.  We did 
bombings, sometimes overtly, and sometimes more covertly in Iraq during this period 
between the First Gulf War and the Second Gulf War.  (You can call it the First Bush 
War or the Second Bush War or the First or Second Gulf War, if you like.)  Of course, 
 
2 Eric A. Posner, Op -Ed, All Justice, Too, Is Local, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004, at A23. 
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that period of intervention was nothing like the massive American invasion that took 
place the second time around. 
¶17 I should state my views right off; I confess to having been in favor of this war.  I do 
not know whether that will make most of you happy or unhappy.  I argued for that war, 
not on the grounds that the Bush Administration gave, which were shifting grounds 
indeed. 
¶18 There were many grounds for the Bush Administration’s justification for American 
invasion of Iraq.  The major one being, of course, the hunt for weapons of mass 
destruction.  I can say that I never found any evidence presented for those weapons of 
mass destruction very credible, and we have good reasons now to understand why there 
was no credible evidence presented. 
¶19 Nor did I find very persuasive another argument made by the Bush Administration, 
that Iraq was the hotbed of terrorism.  Yes, it is true that Saddam provided funds to 
families of suicide bombers against Israel, but if one wanted to look for hotbeds of 
terrorism, both Iran and Syria were probably more deeply embedded in international 
terrorist networks than Iraq had been. 
¶20 Nor did the Bush Administration make, I think, a very strong case for links 
between Al-Queda and Iraq.  Undoubtedly, there was some likeness.  There has been a 
matter of contention as to who was where and who was talking to whom at what place, 
but again, the evidence was not particularly strong to show very close, deep working 
relationships between Al-Queda and Iraq had been formed. 
¶21 And the argument that Saddam was both a tyrant and a violator of his own people’s 
human rights and had engaged in warfare between Iraq and Iran.  Invading Kuwait was 
certainly, I think, true, and to me that Iraq had the potential and had been a destabilizer in 
the Middle East was a more important argument.  I will return in a moment to what I 
think were some more important arguments for the justification for this war. 
¶22 I was not able to be here this morning, and I am sure there was a lot of conversation 
about the decision between preemptive and preventive war.  The Bush Administration 
collapsed the case for preemptive war into Iraq, which I did not find a very persuasive 
case, with preventive war arguments.  As John Gaddis in a recent article in Foreign 
Affairs and others have pointed out, preventive war has meant taking military action 
against the state that was about to launch an attack.4  And again, as I said a moment ago, 
there was no real evidence that Iraq was ready to do that. 
¶23 International law has long allowed such actions to forestall clear and present 
danger; whereas, preventive war has conventionally meant staging a war against a state 
which in the future that pose risks, which, I think, is a more persuasive argument with 
respect to Iraq.  But in the post September 11th context, the Bush Administration 
collapsed the term.  We had, in effect, a preventive war called a preemptive war. 
¶24 And again, I would say that Iraq, compared to Iran and North Korea, posed fewer 
risks that could be justified for carrying out preventive war, at least with respect to 
weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons, in particular. 
¶25 I should also say with these disclaimers that I do not know what the national 
estimates on Iraq have said, because we have not had a release of the national estimates 
 
4 John Lewis Gaddis, Grand Strategy in the Second Term, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 1, 2005, at 2. 
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produced by the intelligence community and by the director of intelligence in the United 
States.  We will only know what those reports say when they are finally declassified. 
¶26 I sat on the senior review panel of the CIA in the late 1980s.  I almost never saw a 
national estimate which was unhedged and came down strongly in a very clear way as 
compared to “on the one hand this, on the other hand that.”  So, I doubt, by the way, that 
the national estimate provides a clear justification for preventive war or much less 
preemptive war either, but I do not know. 
¶27 Now, arrogating to oneself the right to intervene anywhere for preventive war 
purposes makes even one’s allies nervous, as we have seen in at least significant numbers 
of those allies.  And it also has the danger of accelerating a push to countries creating 
nuclear options for themselves for deterrent purposes.  Whether that has been true in Iran, 
I do not know.  Iranians’ aims at creating some kind of nuclear option no doubt predate 
the Second Gulf War, and that is certainly true for North Korea as well.  But one lesson 
you could learn if you were a middle-sized power with the capacity to create a nuclear 
option for yourself is that you want to do it as quickly as possible.  That is a lesson you 
may draw from this. 
¶28 All this said, then why was I in favor of this war?  What were my own justifications 
for it?  And I should say, having hung that label around my own neck, I was in favor in a 
very balanced and measured way.  To me, it was always a very close call.  One reason 
was human rights, perhaps.  Saddam was a horrible killer; he had killed hundreds of 
thousands of his own people.  I believed that he could be brought down rather easily 
militarily, which I think was true. 
¶29 The consequences thereof we will come back to again in a moment.  It is very hard 
to have a view, I think, of consistency with regard to interventions on human rights 
grounds.  Often, you can justify doing what you can do and what you can not do 
militarily in one particular place.  However, you might be able to do it in another one if 
there are other good reasons for acting, and I think, here, consistency is the hobgoblin of 
small minds. 
¶30 Secondly, I thought there was not an analogy with the First Gulf War and that 
removing Saddam could help if one could have a reconstructed Iraq.  If Iraq were joined 
to new diplomacy, it could lead perhaps to a renewed settlement effort on many of the 
outstanding efforts between Israelis and Palestinians.  This may yet occur, though other 
elements such as the death of Yasser Arafat may be more important than the removal of 
Saddam from Iraq. 
¶31 I also thought – and here was my main reason for supporting the war – that for 
those who thought that democracy could grow in Iraq and then spread throughout the 
Arab Middle East, there was certainly a better chance for this to happen with the removal 
of Saddam.  This is what has been called the spill-over argument.  While I think the 
verdict is still out here, the initial returns are hardly good, hardly positive, and one would 
have to stick one’s head very deeply in the sand to say that the removal of Saddam from 
Iraq has led or will easily lead to the creation of some kind of democratic regime in Iraq, 
though that is still not inconceivable. 
¶32 In any case, I think the costs have been too great.  Looking at this war, I would say 
the costs for both the Iraqi people above all, as well as Americans, have been too large to 
have justified this war as I look back on it.  I think my judgment of being in favor of this 
war was an incorrect one, and I have come to regret it. 
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¶33 Part of the reason for bad outcomes in Iraq has to do with terrible decisions made 
by the Bush Administration, ones that Secretary Designate Rice has been starting to 
allude to, although not very specifically, in her own Senate confirmation hearing.  I am 
not going to belabor those decisions, I am just going to list them and read them very 
quickly to move on with my allotted time. 
¶34 Too small levels of occupying forces and poor designation of US troop missions 
led to horrible security problems, looting, loss of faith in the US occupation, very slow 
restoration of services, and personal security problems.  This, on top of poor intelligence 
as to how bad infrastructure had deteriorated in Iraq, and how easily it could perhaps be 
put together again. 
¶35 And here, I think, is a very important point involved in a task force on the Council 
of Foreign Relations in New York, which is looking at post-conflict reconstruction issues.  
Although I am not sure looking at Iraq and looking at Afghanistan in post-conflict 
situations by any means, but nonetheless this task force is looking at post-conflict 
construction issues.  Ambassador Luers referred to some of them when he talked about 
creating new institutions, new legal structures, which I think are very important and 
which have been very, very hard to bring about in the Iraqi concept. 
¶36 But the United States itself has a poor administrative structure for police aid and for 
legal reconstruction.  We have relatively few people with good Arabic language 
capacities and too little know-how on the ground.  Whatever plans there were in the State 
Department had been chucked out the window by the Pentagon, which chose to put its 
own plans in place.  If you could call them plans.  There were very poor assumptions 
about Iraqi internal politics and very poor intelligence again on the prospects for Sunni 
insurgency especially. 
¶37 If you want to look at all the list of horribles of what went wrong, you can look at 
Larry Diamond’s article in a fairly recent edition of Foreign Affairs.5 
¶38 Whether disbanding all the structure, and especially the military, was the right call 
seems very dubious.  Though Ambassador Bremer seems to defend this position, and 
there are arguments that can be made on either side of it. 
¶39 The post-invasion lack of security has been a disaster for this intervention, as I have 
said, above all for the Iraqi people.  I leave aside tactical mistakes, but I do want to say 
now that the consequences of the invasion of Iraq and the aftermath of this invasion, the 
experiences of the last two years will have, I think, a very sobering effect on the Bush 
Administration’s policies and on future American foreign policy. 
¶40 And again, I think it was Sir David who took up a remark perhaps of Ambassador 
Luers on the Somali experience.  I think those were very apt remarks.  Just as Somalia 
had very deep consequences for Rwanda and for American foreign policy in Africa, so 
will this much more massive expenditure of American life in trenches have very vast 
consequences in the evolution of American foreign policy, even for the Bush 
Administration in its second term. 
¶41 I think we are already seeing intimations of this in Secretary Designate Rice’s 
hearings.  We are going to see much more emphasis on diplomacy.  Now, to be fair the 
Bush Administration did try to work through the United Nations and through our allies 
for some time before we evaded Iraq.  We should remember that.  We could debate 
 
5 Larry Diamond, What Went Wrong in Iraq, FOREIGN AFF., Sept. 1, 2004, at 34. 
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whether the Bush Administration gave it enough time, whether war had to have been 
launched when it was launched. 
¶42 I suspect the Bush Administration certainly could have given it more time, but it 
did try.  It did this in a context which I want to call to your attention and which has also 
been alluded to in your deliberations.  It was a context of extreme unilateralism which 
this administration brought to thinking about foreign policy, and you could see it in the 
attitude towards the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Treaty, and strategic arms 
discussions, as well as the language the President himself used in thinking about foreign 
policy both before and after the Iraq invasion. 
¶43 Now, I do not think anybody really expects the United States to cede its right of 
self-protection to others, nor would Americans agree – and it was pointed out that 
Senator Kerry also did not agree – that somehow or other the Security Council or 
anybody else would even in situations of non- imminent threat.  That is the major point I 
wanted to make about the report: even in situations of non-imminent threat, I cannot see 
any American administration agreeing to non-American dispositions about the use of 
force.  It is simply not in the cards. 
¶44 They might try for some period of time for approval of international bodies, 
particularly the Security Council as the United States did try in Iraq.  I think France made 
it very clear that just about nothing the United States could do in the Iraqi case would 
have succeeded in gaining its approval for the American- led invasion.  It was not going to 
permit Security Council approval, and probably the Russians and the Chinese would not 
have either.  That is again debatable. 
¶45 But having said this, of course I do not want to say that only the United States is in 
Iraq.  There has been an important British contingency.  Other countries from time to 
time have also provided force, Italians and others.  Some have withdrawn forces 
subsequently, but American foreign policy as a unilateralist foreign policy simply cannot 
succeed and cannot be sustained over time and certainly not vis-à-vis many conflicts. 
¶46 The US has stretched, pragmatically speaking, too thin in utilitarian economic 
terms, and politically, it is extremely unwise for any great power, even a great 
superpower, to be as isolated as the United States has been in foreign policy over the last 
couple years. 
¶47 But above all, burden-sharing is required, in part, because American military might 
is not met by economic might.  The United States has nothing like the commensurate 
economic power in the world that it has in terms of military power.  It does not dominate 
in any such way.  It does not occupy an economic space anything like its military space.  
Even if we were not in a time of massive American deficits, even if we got out of that 
hole – which will be a very long time coming out –, even if that were the case, the United 
States has nothing like the position economically like it has militarily, so burden-sharing 
is absolutely critical in economic terms. 
¶48 It is also critical in terms of personnel know-how.  There are countries that are 
much better and have much more experience at Administration abroad with much deeper 
history – our British friends are certainly among them – than the United States does.  You 
can not be very impressed by American capacity to do long-term administration abroad in 
terms of language skills, administrative know-how, and categories on the ground.  There 
is a lot of deadwood around, as you pointed out, and there is not as much live wood as 
one would like in terms of those missions. 
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¶49 On critical trade and currency issues, no one can act unilaterally.  These are simply 
issues that will be unilateral issues by definition, but the main point I wanted to make is 
that security stances affect other countries’ dispositions to do business with you in 
economic terms, on trade, and on international currency issues.  Not perfectly correlated, 
but those issues are affected by security stance. 
¶50 Now, let us be fair.  In many places where the United States – and these are my 
concluding remarks, Mr. Chairman – in many places where the United States did take 
action, it did so, I would say, hesitantly.  The United States, if you recall, was not quick 
to act in the former Yugoslavia.  It ceded action including military action to the 
Europeans, who even in their on backyard did not act on human rights grounds or any 
other grounds, because they either lacked good logistical capacity or the political will. 
¶51 So, the United States acted with much more force than its European allies were 
willing to do in the former Yugoslavia.  If one looks at the current discussions going on 
with North Korea today, it is other countries that often have pushed the United States to 
enter bilateral talks with North Korea.  It has been the United States that has wanted 
multi-party talks with North Korea, involving Russia, China, and Japan and the Republic 
of Korea in the South.  So, one should not come to the conclusion that everywhere you 
look, the United States wants to act unilaterally. 
¶52 It is very fair to ask, is NATO really ready for burden-sharing?  Have European 
powers and our other NATO allies, inc luding our Canadian friends, been willing to tax 
themselves and create military forces required, so that there truly is burden-sharing across 
the world in military terms?  That is, I think, a fair question to pose. 
¶53 I exempt the United Kingdom from that question, Sir David.  I would not exempt 
all our other NATO allies from it. 
¶54 Is the Security Council willing to make tough decisions?  Sudan does not suggest 
so.  Yes, one can say Sudan is a complicated place, but it does not get you off the hook 
from really saying, “What is the Security Council willing to do, and what kind of muscle 
is it really willing to put behind its own resolutions or even to be able to formulate those 
resolutions?” 
¶55 So, what the many last months have shown is that if you start with a mission that 
others see as ill- founded and illegitimate, it is very hard to engage those others ex-post, 
although the UN did come into Iraq by June 2003. 
¶56 It was not only the devastating loss of people in the UN mission which led to the 
partial withdrawal, it was also the willingness of the US to share decision-making, and to 
implement in a shared way in Iraq.  And if you want others to be with you, you have to 
do some sharing of common ground, not only the tasks and the burden, but on the 
grounds of decision-making and how you can conduct business.  Thank you. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶57 Thank you, President Bienen.  We will now hear from Ambassador Feisal Istrabadi. 
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FEISAL ISTRABADI:*** 
¶58 Good afternoon.  I want to say how very pleased I am to return to Northwestern.  I 
would say that it is a homecoming, except that I have not yet managed actually to finish 
my LL.M. in human rights here. 
¶59 In the presence of this distinguished audience, including the president of the 
University, let me thank Professor Doug Cassel for his support of my efforts –interrupted 
first by my participation in writing Iraq’s interim constitution thirteen months ago, and 
then by my current duties– to obtain the degree.  He has done everything to get me to 
finish (except actually writing my papers), and I will always be grateful to him.  I say it 
publicly: I still have high hopes for May.  I pause to note that Doug and I first met in 
October 2002, when he and I debated the legality of the then-impending war in Iraq.  
Here we are again. 
¶60 I should say that I am here in my personal capacity.  My observations today are my 
own, not those of my government. 
¶61 The premise of this panel is that the Bush Administration, in the case of Iraq, used 
the doctrine of preventive force against future threat.  I am not quite certain that that is 
true, although I recognize that some of the language used by the Administration might 
suggest it is. 
¶62 It seems to me, however, that the administration relied not so much on this doctrine 
as on Iraq’s failure to discharge its obligations, imposed multiple times by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII, fully to disarm and disclose.  It then asserted that in a world 
after September 11th, it was unwilling to chance its vital security interests on the good 
conduct of Saddam Hussein –an eminently rational view. 
¶63 Even if I am correct in this interpretation, I suppose an entirely different set of 
questions might arise, such as whether a member state has the right unilaterally to enforce 
Security Council resolutions.  Fortunately, that issue is far beyond the parameters of this 
panel. 
¶64 Though the authors of the report clearly reject the coalition’s use of force in Iraq, I 
would argue that the report itself mandates action in Iraq.  After all, it endorses the use of 
force to relieve humanitarian suffering brought about by regimes which effectively 
declare war on and slaughter their own populations.  It is true that the authors sometimes 
reject such action where the Security Council refuses to authorize action – Iraq is a 
paradigm – but the authors undercut their own argument against unauthorized 
intervention, it seems to me. 
¶65 As I will show, when the Council fails to act in a conflict where intervention 
appears desirable to the authors, and where member states act notwithstanding lack of 
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Security Council authorization, the report does not criticize the intervention; rather, it 
criticizes the Security Council. 
¶66 One general observation is worth making.  An arguable weakness of the report is 
that it treats the Council as though it were composed of wise and learned judges and 
scholars applying the norms of international law impartially.  Of course, the Council is no 
such thing.  It consists of fifteen member states of disparate power, each attempting to 
vindicate often irreconcilable agendas. 
¶67 Many council members play a zero-sum power game.  In short, to take the 
recommendation of the Panel seriously on interventions in sensitive places like Iraq or 
the former Yugoslavia, requiring Council approval for intervention relegates the United 
Nations at best to the status of a debating society, if not to that of an idle and mildly 
interested spectator. 
¶68 I begin by observing that, had the report’s view of the coalition’s intervention in 
Iraq prevailed, I would not be here, certainly not as an ambassador from Iraq.  In my 
place, I suppose, Muhammad al-Dori, Saddam Hussein’s last Permanent Representative 
in New York, might be on this panel.  Except that he was not allowed to travel outside the 
five boroughs, this scenario is not so far- fetched.  Dr. al-Dori is a former dean of the 
Faculty of Law at the University of Baghdad, and specialized in international law. 
¶69 If, as the report implies it should have, the United States had backed down in light 
of the Security Council’s failure to act against Saddam, I imagine al-Dori would be 
congratulating himself and the conference participants at the victory of the rule of law 
over lawlessness, emphasizing that, without adherence to international law, the law of the 
jungle would obtain. 
¶70 In the meantime, I, like an estimated three to five million other Iraqis, would be 
midway through my thirty-fifth year in exile, a milestone I would have marked on June 
1st.  Rather than awaiting trial, Saddam would still be free to terrorize twenty-seven 
million souls, treating Iraq like a Mafia family, except that Mafia dons do not have the 
capacity to exterminate hundreds of thousands of people on a whim. 
¶71 Iraq would still be operating under a brutal regime of sanctions which eviscerated 
its middle and intellectual classes, aimed as it was directly at them.  The Kurds would 
still have de facto independence, and the two poles, Baghdad and Erbil-Sulaimania, 
would be continually moving farther apart.  Every now and then, some human rights 
organization or another would regret the gross violations of human rights extant in Iraq.  
God would be in his heaven, and all would be right with the world, in the report’s 
Weltanschauung. 
¶72 But that is not quite the full picture.  To begin with, the report notes that tyrannical 
regimes – or at least sufficiently tyrannical regimes – constitute a threat to world peace 
and security.  Two paragraphs in the report which I have here quoted in full, in the 
interest of time I will not read them, but two paragraphs that are of most particular 
interest here are paragraphs twenty-nine and thirty-six. 
¶73 Paragraph twenty-nine talks about the concept of limiting state sovereignty and 
derogation of the Westphalian system, such that when a member state signs the United 
Nations Charter, it not only has the benefits of sovereignty but also accepts the 
responsibilities of sovereignty.  One of those responsibilities is the obligation of a state to 
protect the welfare of its own people and meet its obligations to the wider international 
community. 
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¶74 Paragraph thirty-six notes that the principle of collective security means that some 
portion of those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community, 
including supplying the necessary protections in the case of human rights abuses. 
¶75 Therefore, governments individually owe the world a duty of protecting their 
citizens against gross human rights abuses, and UN member states have a corresponding 
collective duty to protect citizens of those states whose governments fail to abide by these 
international obligations.  In the context of judging the Iraqi intervention by the report’s 
standards, it is also important to recognize that collapsed or failing states – arguably Iraq 
was certainly collapsing and/or failing – constitute a threat to world security, according to 
the report. 
¶76 In this context, the authors are candid in their criticisms of some of the places 
around the globe where a collective failure to intervene has caused much suffering.  The 
report is scathing in its assessment of the failure to intervene in Rwanda, for instance.  
Here, the authors name names, as we have heard this afternoon, saying that the reason 
that the Security Council failed to act timely is that it was bowing to United States 
pressure. 
¶77 It is curious, however, that, while noting in the next sentence of this paragraph that 
the Council also failed to act to prevent ethnic cleansing and genocide in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the authors fail to note it was another permanent member on this occasion 
which applied pressure to which the Council bowed.  I will leave it to others to comment 
upon why it is that the United States is named as the reason for whatever failure obtained, 
while other countries get a pass. 
¶78 Kosovo is precisely the type of collective security intervention by the United 
Nations of which the authors seem to approve.  Unfortunately, of course, there was no 
such collective intervention.  For the same reasons that such intervention was impossible 
in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Security Council failed to act in the case of 
Kosovo. 
¶79 There, it was NATO which intervened.  The listener, expecting objectivity from a 
report of this type will, quite naturally, expect the same scathing criticism of NATO as 
one finds of the Iraq Coalition for “erod[ing]” the “spirit of international purpose” by 
intervening in Iraq.  Such a listener would be disappointed.  Paralysis in the Security 
Council, according to the report, led NATO to bypass the UN.  It is the UN’s fault, in 
other words, that NATO was left with no choice but to act outside the international 
system. 
¶80 Why the intervention in Iraq cannot be justified on the same basis, I must confess, 
is a mystery to me.  I take it that the brutality of Iraq’s previous regime is stipulated in 
this audience.  No need for me to mention the genocide of the Kurds, the mass killings of 
the Marsh Arabs, and the total brutalization of an entire country.  We all know that the 
Baathist government continued to carry out a brutal regime of ethnic and sectarian 
cleansing.  That regime’s history regarding its weapons program is also of record, and I 
need not recite it here. 
¶81 Notwithstanding these facts, two permanent members announced prior to 19 March 
2003 that they would veto any authorization resolution in the Security Council, one 
saying that in no circumstance would it fail to veto an authorization resolution.  One can 
easily imagine a different, perhaps more consistent, set of authors concluding that it was 
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this paralysis on the Council which compelled the coalition to intervene in Iraq, thus 
bypassing the UN. 
¶82 The report elsewhere criticizes the UN for its docility.  In the authors’ words, the 
world body has acted with “glacial speed” in Darfur, for instance.  Indeed, in 
exasperation, the authors note that over the past decade and a half, the world body was 
has only acted in East Timor in concert with nationa l governments and regional 
organizations to prevent mass-killings.  The catalogue of failures by the Security Council 
to prevent or intervene in places where genocide and mass-killing were underway does 
not, it is worthy to note, allude to Iraq and its former government –not Iraq’s invasion of 
Iran, not Saddam’s brutality.  One might be accused of gross naïveté in hoping that the 
oversight was not done intentionally to avoid any chance of sympathy the reader might 
have for the 2003 intervention in Iraq. 
¶83 I realize that the report’s conclusions are hortatory, not descriptive.  Still, in this 
audience many of whose members will be quite sympathetic to the positivist legal 
tradition, I must ask: whence emerges this predisposition towards collective action by the 
Security Council?  For all the protestations to the contrary, a careful reading of the report 
indicates that the instances in which member states have sought and obtained Security 
Council approval to go to war can be counted on the fingers of one hand.  Chad, for 
instance, appears nowhere in the report.  Putting aside East Timor and peacekeeping 
operations authorized after the fact, Iraq in 1991 seems to be the foremost example, along 
with Afghanistan in 2001. 
¶84 Indeed, the report concedes as much, when it allows in one of its understatements 
that “Collectively authorized use of force may not be the rule today.”  Yet the authors 
assert that an expectation obtains that the Security Council should be the arbiter of the 
use of force.  Who has that expectation?  Can it be reasonably asserted that such an 
expectation is extant when two permanent members went to war with a coalition of some 
thirty nations without troubling themselves over the lack of specific Security Council 
authorization? 
¶85 Other than efficiency, why should the Security Council be the UN arbiter anyway?  
My colleague, Mr. Luers, predicted someone from the Third World would say that and 
here I am. 
¶86 The Security Council operates very much like a closed club, with zero 
transparency.  Even if the number of seats on the Security Council is increased, the 
proposed total membership will not significantly exceed ten percent of UN member 
states.  The General Assembly, on the other hand, operates far more transparently, and 
has the advantage of having every member state represented.  I ask rhetorically why it 
should not be the arbitrator of the use of force, and is it, in fact, realistic to expect great 
powers to cede this power to any organ of the United Nations or any other international 
body. 
¶87 As it relates to Iraq and its liberation from a brutal tyrant, the report leaves much to 
be desired.  Nor is it only the report which is wanting.  At the opening of the fifty-ninth 
session of the General Assembly last September, the Secretary-General repeatedly 
emphasized the rule of law, exhorting member states not to act unilaterally.  That was 
obviously a thinly-veiled criticism of the coalition’s intervention in Iraq.  I begin with the 
premise that a world order which can justify the continued presence of a brutal tyrant like 
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Saddam Hussein by congratulating itself about the existence of the rule of law is an order 
that has nothing to say to me or to my compatriots. 
¶88 I applaud the authors of the report for their conviction in insisting that the civilized 
world should not tolerate the existence of despotism.  I regret that they did not have the 
courage of that conviction in recognizing that coalition intervention in Iraq accomplished 
precisely that greater moral and legal good: the liberation of a member state and its 
people from absolute tyranny. 
¶89 Thank you. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶90 Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.  We will now hear from Jan Wouters. 
JAN WOUTERS: 
¶91 It is a great pleasure and honor to be here at this Fourth Transatlantic Dialogue co-
organized by the Universities of Leuven and Northwestern. 
¶92 The first of these conferences have taken place in Brussels in the European 
Parliament, focusing on terrorism, the death penalty, and international criminal justice, 
respectively; now we have moved to the other side of the Atlantic to Chicago to discuss a 
number of interesting issues relating to human rights and UN reform. 
¶93 I was told – but I will not quote my source – that a good slogan characterizing 
Chicago and its citizens is “Ubi est mea?”, a Latin phrase which one can freely translate 
as: “What can I find in this for me?”  We could apply this saying to the High-Level Panel 
Report on Threats, Challenges and Change: what can the United States find in this report 
to legitimize its war against Iraq?  When reading the report, the question how the United 
States’ decision to act without Security Council authorization in the war with Iraq has 
impacted the future role of the UN, which is one of the crucial questions of this 
conference, could receive a rather brief answer: it has not. 
¶94 The Panel has not only been very pragmatic in the changes that it recommends to 
make the UN better-suited to face modern threats to security – remember Lord Hannay’s 
words of this morning: no blue sky thinking.  It has also, with regard to the jus ad bellum, 
firmly confirmed its belief in the solidity of the UN Charter as it stands: no need for 
changes. 
¶95 The Panel strongly reiterates the Charter’s fundamental principle prohibiting the 
use or the threat of force, and sees no reason for changing or even re- interpreting either 
Article 51 of the Charter on the right to self-defense or the provisions of Chapter VII, 
which sets out the enforcement powers of the Security Council in the face of threats to, 
and breaches of, the peace.  Only the references to the Military Staff Committee should 
be removed in the articles concerned, as the Panel recommends, making the Secretary-
General’s Military Adviser and the members of his staff available on demand by the 
Security Council in order to provide professional military advice to the latter. 
¶96 However, upon closer reading of the Panel Report, one does notice some very 
interesting considerations which are clearly aimed at addressing the United States’ 
security concerns as they also underlie the US decision to go to war with Iraq.  In my 
presentation, I will focus on these considerations, first of all, by addressing the right to 
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self-defense, and by looking into the role of the Security Council under Chapter VII of 
the Charter. 
¶97 One preliminary reflection upon reading the report relates to the following.  The 
Panel attaches, and I think rightly so, great importance to a common global understanding 
and acceptance of when the application of force is both legal and legitimate, as “[o]ne of 
these elements being satisfied without the other will always weaken the international 
legal order – and thereby put both state and human security at greater risk.”6 
¶98 I fully endorse that statement, which stresses the need to have both legality and 
legitimacy in place in order to sustainedly uphold the international rules on the use of 
force.  I would just observe that, in terms of the structure of the report, it is interesting to 
see that the right to self-defense is only addressed from the legal point of view and not 
from a legitimacy perspective. 
¶99 The report only develops a five-pronged test of legitimacy criteria for the Security 
Council to apply when it authorizes or endorses the use of force.  That is maybe logical in 
light of the restrictive interpretation which the Panel gives to the right of self-defense.  
Some may argue that, with such a strict interpretation, the legitimacy issue does not really 
arise here. 
¶100 Still, I think it does, and I would submit that if UN member states were more 
lenient in their interpretation of self-defense, the least one should say is that the 
considerations of the Panel concerning the legitimacy of the Security Council mandating 
the use of force should also be taken very seriously for unilateral action as well.  But 
maybe that is what we can read in paragraph 209 of the report,7 where the Panel states 
that it would be valuable if individual member states, whether or not they are members of 
the Security Council, subscribe to these guidelines. 
¶101 Let me now share with you some reflections about the right to self-defense.  As is 
known, the US Government did not invoke the right to self-defense as a legal justification 
for its military actions against Iraq in 2003.  The legal base asserted by the US was that 
the invasion was lawful under international law based on previous Security Council 
resolutions from the early 1990s by which the Security Council had authorized a coalition 
of states to repel Iraq from Kuwait and to restore peace and security in the area. 
¶102 I will come back to this issue of Security Council-based mandates in the last part of 
my presentation. 
¶103 This being said, I personally continue to have difficulties with a legal reasoning 
that reads into old Security Council resolutions a revitalization of an old mandate to use 
force more than ten years afterwards with a different coalition and with a different 
purpose.  It is often stated in the literature that the Iraq War did, in fact, constitute a first 
application of the doctrine of preemptive strikes as laid out in the new US Security 
Strategy in 2002.  If that were the case, how would one deal with this from the viewpoint 
of the Panel Report? 
¶104 For all clarity: I am now going to use, in accordance with the Panel Report, the 
expression “preemptive” use of force when speaking of acting in anticipatory self-
defense against an imminent threat, and will therefore change terminology.  “Preventive” 
 
6 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, ¶ 184, UN Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [here inafter A More Secure World]. 
7 Id. at ¶ 209, UN Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (“We also believe it would be valuable if individual 
member states, whether or not they are members of the Security Council, subscribed to them.”) 
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use of force means the use of force against non- imminent or non-proximate threat.  In 
passing, I would observe that there is a place in the Panel Report where, interestingly, 
when discussing “preemptive” use of force, it speaks not only just of imminent threats 
but also of “proximate” threats.8 
¶105 As to the preemptive use of force, the Panel takes the position that the current legal 
framework is enough in the sense that it is of the view that one should keep Article 51 of 
the Charter.  It does not favor rewriting or reinterpreting it.  However, it should be noted 
that when the Panel makes statements about the interpretation of the right to self-defense, 
it refers not to Article 51 but to established international law, in other words, to 
customary international law.  The Panel states that, under customary international law, it 
is lawful for states to take military action in the face of a threat, as long as the threat and 
attack are imminent, no other means will deflect it, and the action is proportionate.  There 
is an interesting footnote in the report at this juncture: it makes reference to three 
American authors.  I would respectfully submit that there is other literature that takes 
another point of view, but only these three authorities were mentioned. 
¶106 What is interesting here is that the Panel says that one does not need to reinterpret 
Article 51, when, in fact, it is doing just that.  It considers this same Article 51 through 
the lens of customary international law; whereas, in the Nicaragua Case, the International 
Court of Justice indicated that there are two regimes.  On the one hand, there is 
customary international law with the inherent right of self-defense; on the other hand, 
there is the Charter regime of Article 51.  In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ has, in fact, 
rejected the complete identity of the customary law regime and the Charter regime. 
¶107 So it is not necessarily the same thing, but the Panel interprets Article 51 in a 
manner consistent with general international law, which I find a very interesting point of 
view. 
¶108 But what is not addressed at this juncture in the report and what is also rather 
important is the question as to how far the notion of self-defense goes with regard to the 
armed attack and the question of who is doing the armed attack.  You may remember that 
with regard to 9/11, there was a whole debate on whether the terrorist attacks constituted 
an attack under Article 51, i.e. whether these attacks emanated from a state or were at 
least attributable to a state.  This is not addressed in the report. 
¶109 When one deals with terrorism, the counterparts are often non-state actors, so the 
whole question of whether or not the acts are attributable to a particular State should be 
addressed.  In the most recent case law of the International Court of Justice, such as the 
advisory opinion on the Israeli security wall, one sees that the ICJ sticks to the idea that, 
at least, the attack should be attributable to a state. 
¶110 In any event, the most interesting part comes when we deal with the preventive use 
of force, i.e. where there is no such imminent or even proximate threat.  There, the Panel 
makes a statement that merits full quotation.  In paragraph 190, when it deals with the 
question whether there can be a legitimate use of preventive force, the report states: “The 
short answer is that if there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good 
evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can authorize 
such action if it chooses to.  If it does not so chose, there will be, by definition, time to 
 
8 Id. at ¶ 189. 
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pursue other strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrents, and containment – 
and to visit again the military option.” 
¶111 This is a fascinating paragraph, because the question arises: what does it mean to 
visit again the military option at the end? 
¶112 I do not dare to say what the Panel had in mind – this is more or less an open 
invitation to Lord Hannay to comment on it – but can we not interpret this quotation in 
two ways?  Either you have to go back to the Security Council and stay there even if the 
latter persistently says no, or you can, after having really tried all the options, including 
persuasion, negotiation, deterrents, and so on, finally revisit the military option as a 
unilateral action. 
¶113 This is a very interesting passage in the report.  In any event, the question arises 
whether, if we were to apply this quotation to the case of the Iraq War, the US’s action 
and decision to go to war was in conformity with it.  We know that the US went to the 
Security Council.  We also know that, at least in Europe, there was a perception that there 
was some impatience with regard to the results that had to be produced and the 
deliberations.  Was there enough time left to pursue other strategies?  Were UN 
inspections given sufficient time?  My personal assessment is that they were not. 
¶114 The question arises whether the doctrine of humanitarian intervention would have 
been a better call from the viewpoint of the Panel.  One may recall from this morning’s 
presentations that the Panel indeed recognizes in its report the emerging norm of a 
collective international responsibility to protect.  However, the report speaks of a 
collective international responsibility, and it adds to this, that the duty is “exercisable by 
the Security Council authorizing military intervention.” 
¶115 So only the Security Council can mandate this in the eyes of the Panel.  It is also 
spelled out that this is only to be done as a last resort and only in the event of genocide, 
other large-scale killing and ethnic cleansing, and violations of international humanitarian 
law.  The report does not mention anywhere unilateral humanitarian interventions.  It 
would be interesting to come back to this point later in the discussion. 
¶116 Prodemocratic intervention, which was also sometimes mentioned as a justification 
for the Iraq War, can not be found in the Panel Report, neither to justify a collective use 
of force, nor to justify a unilateral use of force. 
¶117 If I may, I would still like to give some brief reflections from the viewpoint of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
¶118 The Panel Report, in fact, is very orthodox when it comes to reaffirming the 
exclusive right of the Security Council – barring self-defense, of course – to authorize the 
use of force.  It does not speak out on the question, which more or less arose in the Iraq 
case, whether old Security Council mandates can be revitalized when a material breach of 
the conditions of a cease fire occurs. 
¶119 Let us assume for a moment that the Security Council back in 2003 would have 
gone along with the US.  The question, from the viewpoint of the Panel Report, would 
then arise whether the five-pronged legitimacy test that the Panel advances, would have 
been met. 
¶120 I briefly recall it: serious threat, proper purpose, last result, proportionality, balance 
of consequences.  I would respectfully argue that (almost) none of these five tests were 
met in this case.  A serious threat, justifying – as the Panel says – prima facie use of 
military force: in my view, and with hindsight, this was not the case. 
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¶121 Proper purpose.  There, of course, one can have a whole debate.  What the Panel 
Report asks, is what the primary purpose to halt the threat is.  There has been a lot of 
disagreement on this in the international community. 
¶122 Was the use of force the last resort?  I think that is almost a rhetorical question 
based on the fact that UN inspections could have been carried much further under 
Security Council Resolution 1441. 
¶123 Was it proportional?  There, the big question is, when the Security Council 
mandates the use of force to, for instance, rid the country of weapons of mass destruction, 
whether that is a sufficient mandate to go as far as a forcible regime change. 
¶124 The final test – and the most difficult I find – is the balance of consequences where 
the Panel asks: “[i]s there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in 
meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse 
than the consequences of inaction.”9  Were the consequences of action – in this case, 
invasion – not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction?  This is a very 
difficult test to apply, and I think, in all fairness, that very few countries and observers 
would have predicted that the toppling of Saddam Hussein would lead to such a period of 
prolonged instability in Iraq. 
¶125 Therefore, there are some sobering lessons for all of us to draw from this tragedy.  
The richness and the detail of the text and considerations in the Panel Report regarding 
the use of force shows, I think, that one could staunchly contradict what I read in a book 
that I bought just yesterday in a famous book store not too far from the Northwestern law 
library. 
¶126 It is a book by Jed Babbin, a former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense under the 
administration of President Bush, Sr., entitled “Inside the Asylum: Why the United 
Nations and Old Europe Are Worse than You Think.”10  From the first page, it is more or 
less a vitriolic attack on the United Nations.  The interesting thing is that it also attacks 
the European Union and repeatedly refers to the United States as “the EUnuchs.”  On 
page seventy-nine, Babbin writes about the setting up of the High-Level Panel Report and 
says, “The panel will labor for months and produce a mouse.  Or more likely a rat.”11  
Babbin then submits that because Annan has already told the Panel what he wants (he 
wants a third world country, probably from among the Arab states, to become a veto-
holding member of the Security Council), this will make Security Council actions against 
terrorists and the countries that harbor them impossible. 
¶127 With all due respect, I would argue as an international lawyer and also as president 
of the United Nations Association of Flanders-Belgium that the Panel did not produce a 
rat, but rather a unique reflection on how to revitalize an essential institution of world 
peace, the United Nations. 
¶128 Thank you. 
 
9 Id. at ¶ 207. 
10 JED BABBIN, INSIDE THE ASYLUM: WHY THE UNITED NATIONS AND OLD EUROPE ARE WORSE THAN 
YOU THINK (2004). 
11 Id. at 79. 
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STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶129 On behalf of us all, I thank our panel members for highly interesting and 
stimulating remarks.  Our purpose now is to call upon you, the members of the audience, 
to pose questions. 
¶130 However, before we hear from the members of the audience, I would like to offer 
the opportunity to Lord Hannay and to Mr. Luers to make some brief comments in 
connection with what the panel has said this afternoon. 
¶131 So Lord Hannay, will you proceed? 
SIR DAVID HANNAY: 
¶132 Thank you very much.  Well, I am afraid you have all been hearing too much from 
me today, but let me very briefly respond. 
¶133 First of all, I think perhaps it might be honest of me to tell you that my personal 
position on Iraq is quite similar to that of the president of this great university; that is to 
say, I too supported the action that was taken, although I have come later to doubt 
whether the consequences were properly thought through.  And I have very severe 
criticisms of a number of the decisions that were taken after the end of the military 
operations. 
¶134 I just wanted to say that because I think it is always well on these occasions to be 
clear about where you are starting from. 
¶135 Secondly, again on Iraq, I would say that – I am sure you know this – the British 
Government’s case for taking military action was solely based on an interpretation of 
Security Council resolutions.  It did not, therefore, lend itself to any application of 
doctrines of preventive war or anything like that. 
¶136 Saddam had not complied with the Security Council resolutions and had been 
found by the Security Council not to have complied.  That is what 1441 said in the fall of 
2002, and the new way therefore that it was legitimate to take military action against him 
under the preexisting authorizations of 1990 and 1991. 
¶137 That was the basis.  Now, the fact that the factual underpinning of that has 
subsequently disappeared has, of course, caused all the politicians concerned an 
enormous amount of trouble, but that is the position. 
¶138 Now the points on the Panel.  I was fascinated by the Iraqi Ambassador’s very 
ingenious reconstruction of the report in such a way as to show what the report would 
have meant if it had been applied to the action in Iraq which actually took place two years 
before it was written. 
¶139 We went to the very greatest trouble in writing this report not to recycle the events 
of Iraq through what we were writing because it was quite clear to us that if we had done 
so, we would have made enemies on all sides and not have advanced anything at all. 
¶140 So, although I enjoyed listening to his analysis, I have to say that you will not find 
anyone on the Panel who will say what would have happened if the Panel’s report had 
been applied by United Nations to the events in Iraq two years before.  It was a deliberate 
decision not to say that.  I cannot and should not stop anyone who wishes to try and 
analyze it in the way he has analyzed it.  That was not the way that we went about our 
business at all. 
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¶141 On the famous paragraph 191, I am afraid I am not going to be very helpful to you.  
I am not going to try and construe it.  I am certainly prepared to construe the 
recommendations of the report.  But when it comes to the commentary, and this 
paragraph is a paragraph in commentary, it is not a recommendation, I think it is better 
not to elaborate.  If I had to say just one word about it: yes, indeed, there is a kind of 
loophole there that is perfectly clear. 
¶142 I think the Panel was very conscious of the fact that we were not the International 
Court of Justice.  It was not for us to write international law, and we were not writing 
international law when we wrote that report.  We were writing a policy report with policy 
recommendations; and secondly, we were very conscious that the UN, as somebody said 
this morning, has fallen into problems for many, many years through excessive 
expectations and through a rather, I would say, sloppy way of giving the impression that 
it can solve absolutely every problem all the time.  “Just come along to Uncle at the UN 
and we will give you the answer.” 
¶143 I think in that paragraph we are admitting that even the Panel’s report did not have 
the answers to all situations, and we were not trying to produce a kind of matrix which 
would be applied rigidly to every circumstance that might come along, and that is what 
that paragraph really says. 
¶144 But I do not want to go any further than that in commenting upon it. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶145 Mr. Luers. 
WILLIAM LUERS: 
¶146 If we are confessing where we stood, I will have to say that I stood one hundred 
percent opposed to that war, and I never thought in the case of my friendships in New 
York, virtually everybody I knew and respected in the area of foreign affairs referred to 
themselves as reluctant hawks.  That was the term of reference in terms of how they 
thought about the war.  They did not really want to do it, but they thought it had to be 
done. 
¶147 Two points.  One, I think something that Henry said sparked my thinking.  Rand 
Corporation is doing a study, which is coming out very soon.  You know, Rand gets a 
great deal of its money from the Department of Defense, and they are doing a study on 
peacekeeping over the last forty years, what worked and what did not.  They take the case 
of several US operations and several UN operations, and they conclude surprisingly that 
the UN does far better than the United States time and again and that the United Nations 
has the capacity to stick with the problem and work it through. 
¶148 And the recidivism of those places where the United Nations was, I can not cite all 
the cases, but I think it will be an interesting book to come out. 
¶149 Let me just say one more thing about the future. 
¶150 I said in my conversation that, in fact, I cannot imagine an exit strategy from Iraq 
without the United Nations.  I have to say that there is the very optimistic scenario that 
these elections and the subsequent work on the constitution will lead toward a political 
amelioration of the civil war that we are witnessing, and eventually toward an Iraq that 
has a representative government of some sorts that can manage its own affairs internally. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS [ 2 0 0 5  
 
92 
¶151 I guess my own reading today is that that is an extremely unlikely possibility and 
that the more likely possibility is that this election, although it has to be held next week, 
will result in a pre-civil war environment in which one large important group of Iraqis 
feel disenfranchised.  The Kurds will feel overwhelmingly disenfranchised as will the 
Shiites, and that is a formula possibly for a continuing deterioration, both militarily and 
politically. 
¶152 And the question I have is at some point: will the President and will the 
administration decide that this is not going well and say it in saying, “The dream that we 
hoped for is not going to work.”  Or, “It is going to work and we are going to make it 
work in a different way than we are doing now,” and not manage to deal with the 
situation with military force but through a political negotiation which ultimately is what 
has to happen. 
¶153 At that point, although the United Nations cannot enter physically with any 
substitute military presence, it will only be the United Nations, it seems to me, that will 
be able to pull together the neighbors who ultimately will be the answer to this problem. 
¶154 And the United States without the United Nations will have to find ways in which 
Iran, Syria, the Saudis, the Turks, and the Jordanians will to come together in some way 
to help work with the political factions over which they have influence and relationships 
in order to find a way for the neighborhood to work this out. 
¶155 Nobody in the neighborhood, with the possible exception of Israel, would like to 
see this continue in the mess it is in now.  It is not in anybody’s interest for this to be 
prolonged, and it is likely to be clearer and clearer over time that a large-scale US 
military presence is a profound inhibition to further work in reaching a political solution. 
¶156 I was around and deeply involved when we pulled out of Vietnam.  That option we 
do not have.  We do not have that sort of, “We won, let us get out.” 
¶157 There has to be another option.  I do not see that option taking place, assuming 
things go badly, which is my bet, without the United Nations.  Okay. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶158 Okay.  We will take questions now from the floor. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: 
¶159 All that you have just said, in your view, I would like to hear the Ambassador’s 
view from where he sees things as an Iraqi and as having continued to work with the 
population, so you painted us a picture, and I do not – I mean, I totally accept what you 
are saying, and I understand it.  I would like to hear his picture as he sees things at this 
moment in that vein. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶160 Okay.  Next. 
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: 
¶161 Thank you.  Two questions for the Iraqi Ambassador.  (Inaudible).  Could you tell 
us more about this assumption? 
ANTHONY SMITH: 
¶162 My name is Anthony Smith.  I am a local engineer for the Burlington Northern 
Santa Fe Railroad, and the question I had, I heard one member of the panel who was for 
the war in Iraq say that some of the reasons that he had for going to war, he had changed.  
And the question is, if it was wrong to go to war, why is it so right to stay there? 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶163 Okay.  Yes, sir. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: 
¶164 To what extent does the self-serving personal and national interest of a Council 
member affect their vote?  For example, in reading some items on the Arab press, we 
used force in order to obtain oil resources in the base of the Middle East as one of the 
goals.  With regard to other countries, other members, there has been some benefit from 
the Oil for Food Program, and also they had large debts to collect from Iraq when Iraq 
would fall. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶165 All right, sir. 
CHUCK PAYNE: 
¶166 My name is Chuck Payne and I am from Wisconsin. 
¶167 My question relates to the five principles, and particularly the proportionality 
principle regarding the legitimacy of war and the idea that the Iraq War may be the latest 
in a long series, including Vietnam, World War I, and then the others, where we seem to 
learn from unfortunate experience that the war that you get is not the war that you 
envisioned.  So that whatever concept of proportionality you may have had in advance 
does not play out, and especially in the era of nuclear weapons.  Should that not be borne 
in mind in looking at proportionality? 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶168 All right. 
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: 
¶169 It seems to me that possibly from the standpoint of the Ambassador that it was a 
good thing because it worked out, at least to some extent in Iraq, but what if it did more 
damage to international relations, and led to greater turmoil in other areas in the future?  I 
am wondering if anybody can comment on whether they feel it did more damage aside 
from the immediate situation in Iraq. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶170 Okay. 
MIKE KIRK: 
¶171 Mike Kirk, Citizens for Global Solutions.  If 9/11 had not happened to the US, 
would the Administration have been as readily available to go into Iraq and do what it 
did, or would that have been delayed somewhat? 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶172 All right. 
AUDIENCE MEMBER: 
¶173 I would like to address the three reasons that President Bienen gave for why he 
initially supported the war in Iraq. 
¶174 I noted that when he changed his mind, it was not because he felt the reasons were 
wrong, but it was a cost-benefit analysis that changed his mind. 
¶175 Okay.  The first reason was that Saddam was a killer, so this is a human rights 
issue, so he poses it in an issue of war or no war.  However, if the sanctions had not been 
trumped by greed and had really worked well in the benefit of the citizens, would that 
have been a possibility of dealing with Saddam without going to war? 
¶176 The second one that you gave was the road to Jerusalem leads through Baghdad.  I 
would really like a more in-depth explanation of what you mean by that. 
¶177 And then the third one, the spill-over argument of removing Saddam from Iraq, 
well, one could say that maybe we had better grounds to establish democracy in Iraq. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶178 All right.  Thank you 
SARAH JOE: 
¶179 Hi.  I just have a question, I guess, for everyone.  I am Sarah Joe.  I am a student 
here at the school. 
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¶180 For the question of the human rights violations, what specifically was going on 
now that needed to be addressed as opposed to other human rights violation that are 
going on that should be addressed now? 
¶181 And also specifically for the Iraqi Ambassador, would it be that you were saying 
that any kind of tyrannical dictatorship should be overthrown, but would you advocate 
going to war in cases like the Saudis? 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶182 Okay.  We will now turn to the panelists in the same order as they proceeded before 
to respond to the questions that have been put.  President Bienen. 
PRESIDENT BIENEN : 
¶183 Thank you. 
¶184 On this cost-benefit question, I think you are characterizing me pretty much 
accurately.  First, cost-benefit has to always be looked at in timeframes, and that is one of 
the most difficult things about any assumption or analysis of costs and benefits. 
¶185 And my favorite little epigram on that is Chou En- lai once was asked to assess the 
consequences of the French Revolution, and he said, “Too soon to say.”  And I think it is 
a very good point.  So as we look back on all sorts of difficult decisions which are taken, 
our optic on those decisions, I think, varies depending on the hindsight, the time of the 
hindsight. 
¶186 You know, you can think about this in terms of the Vietnam War where lots of the 
arguments that were given for it look very odd in terms of what was then the Sino-Soviet 
conflict, but the perspective on it at the time was somewhat different.  A decade later or 
another decade, I think it will be different twenty years from now. 
¶187 I think it is an important point for everybody to have in their mind when talking 
about cost and benefits.  Sometimes the cost looks very staggeringly high at a given 
point, and sometimes they look worth it or not worth it at different time periods as well as 
the benefits. 
¶188 The other general point that I wanted to make, and I will try to be more specific 
about it in a moment, is unintended consequences.  Every social scientist knows that all 
kinds of actions have unintended consequences, and policy makers try to think about 
consequences in terms of intentional, what may be the conceivable unintended 
consequence or effects of their actions. 
¶189 And so when the – maybe not the very First Gulf War, you are right, there have 
been more than one Gulf War.  From the point of view of Iraqis it is not just two by any 
means, but if you go back to the multiple reasons that the first Bush Administration, 
George the first, gave on the invasion into the Gulf, it was shifting even at that time. 
¶190 Multiple arguments were made from oil to destroying Kuwait’s sovereignty and not 
letting violation of international norms when Saddam invaded Kuwait, preserving sea 
lanes.  I mean, there were ten different arguments and they shifted around to some extent 
to what we have now.  Why?  Because that is an accurate reflection of the way policy 
makers think. 
¶191 It is not just cynical having lots of floating-around arguments.  It is when you have 
policy decisions, lots of people bring up lots of reasons for doing or not doing something 
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in terms of unintended consequences, and you try to understand in a position of imperfect 
information, and that is the third general point I want to make. 
¶192 Everybody’s information is highly imperfect in the world.  If you had perfect 
information, life would be nice in running a university or running a foreign policy or 
anything else, making economic decisions, investing in the stock market.  We have very 
imperfect information in the world, and we often have asymmetrical information.  
Somebody else you are dealing with may know more or less than what you know about 
it. 
¶193 When I think back on the war, which is still ongoing, if I had known that this 
insurgency would be so difficult, so embedded, and the Ambassador and I were talking 
about this after the Pane l, I would have said that the costs were too high, maybe even the 
costs for the Iraqi people, but I am not an Iraqi.  I do not live in Iraq.  And that is a funny 
judgment that I make about that.  Iraqis can make their own judgment, and I am sure they 
will make their own judgment about this. 
¶194 From the perspective of the United States, if one had told American policymakers 
at the time that these decisions were being made that it would cost this many billions with 
this much debt, and that the exit would be not in sight, and as to what the exit might even 
look like, I do not think that the same decisions would have been made. 
¶195 Now, it is hard for me to know how much of the outcome was from bad strategic 
and tactical decisions that the United States took, and how much of it was in the cards.  
To me, that is just an unanswerable question until we get lots of history, and even then 
we might never be able to come to a judgment.  It is an important question because it 
affects how you will act in the future, and it is in a way almost unanswerable, but it is 
why we often go back to history to learn lessons. 
¶196 The trouble is that history does not repeat itself neatly for us, and so we never learn 
lessons because they are in a way not quite learnable.  It is not that we are stupid; it is that 
life changes.  It is, you know, the old question about putting your finger in the stream.  Is 
it the same stream, you got the same finger ten seconds later or whatever. 
¶197 Now, the proportionality argument is in part what I am talking about, and I take this 
gentleman’s point on proportionality because I think the unintended consequences and 
the problem of understanding the downstream consequences of what you are doing 
should make one adverse to going to war. 
¶198 That would be my view, and that was my view in the Iraqi case, partially because it 
was hard to know and hard to measure what the consequences would be.  And, at best, 
you knew that overthrowing a Sunni minority in Iraq would mean that large numbers of 
people, including large numbers of people that had much use for Saddam, would be very 
unhappy.  This was as an historic minority regime, going back to the post-tradition 
colonial regime.  There would be many people whose privileges rested on that minority 
Government who would not have the same kinds of privileges in something like a 
democratic system.  Moreover, it was a place with lots of ethnic and geographic conflicts 
not located in any neat way. 
¶199 The Kurds are not just in the north, but there are Kurds in Baghdad.  The Shiites are 
not just in the south, but there are many in Baghdad.  Even in Mosul, there are both 
Kurds and Sunnis.  There are Arabs in Mosul.  It is a very mixed-up place, which made it 
hard to sort out and hard to know what the local conflicts would be and how they would 
play out independently of what happens at the national level. 
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¶200 All this, I think, gave me great pause in terms of proportionality, so I accept the 
proportionality arguments. 
¶201 One of the reasons why we were talking about this was with respect to Rwanda.  I 
was very much in favor of American intervention in Rwanda.  One, because I thought it 
would save many lives, and, two, because I thought it would be intervention.  There was 
no army that you were confronting in Rwanda.  There were gangs.  And you could go in 
and go out, and still save lots of lives, and there was a misunderstanding of the historical 
experience in Somalia. 
¶202 The American intervention in Somalia worked in my mind.  We saved lots of lives 
in Somalia.  We delivered lots of foodstuffs so many thousands of people did not die of 
famine, and unfortunately Congress did not have any patience with it.  Americans 
soldiers were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu and we went out.  But, we also 
changed the position in Somalia from the time we started to the time left.  All that is 
important, I think. 
¶203 I will try to finish up with one other point, and that is the point that was asked – 
two points maybe. 
¶204 One, sanctions, and the other the road to Jerusalem runs through Baghdad.  What I 
meant by that is in the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait, which was overturned when 
Saddam’s forces were driven out of Kuwait, it opened up prospects for negotiations.  A 
kind of logjam broke open between Arabs and Israelis, if you recall.  There was much 
momentum, and Israelis felt that the most formidable army (or certainly one of the 
formidable armies) that threatened them was now gone.  This, I think, made them more 
willing to enter negotiations and to take perhaps some risks.  Not perfectly so.  Saddam 
certainly was not the only obstacle to a settlement between Arabs and Israelis, but he was 
a very formidable obstacle indeed. 
¶205 So the argument that was made in policy circles, both in the early 1990s as well as 
now, that the removal of Saddam would be a removal of the obstacle to peace.  
Obviously, he was not the only obstacle to peace.  He was very difficult.  I do not know 
what I think of the argument that Israelis would be in favor of instability. 
¶206 Maybe that argument that Israel would gain could be made with regard to the Iran-
Iraq War and the weakening of two major armies.  I think that would be a very short-
sighted Israeli view, if it is a view.  Instability in a core part of the Middle East and in as 
important a country as Iraq is, in my mind, not in Israel’s interest.  Israel’s interest is in a 
stable regime and a very different regime from Saddam’s. 
¶207 Whether people share that view, maybe not all Israel policy, but that was the point.  
This gentleman asked the same question.  It was an opening up and a chance, you know, 
does that mean that the Iraqi Government that comes to power after the election or a year 
from now will necessarily be friendly to Israel?  Not at all.  That is a regime that will 
have its own interest and its own concerns and will be an historic forum.  What its 
relations with Iran will be, I do not know, but at least it will be a different regime than the 
Saddam regime. 
¶208 I have learned a lesson in thinking that things could not be worse.  I will give you a 
little vignette.  I was working in the Sudan with US AID at the time when Nimeiri was 
very shaky.  The project was to advise the Sudanese Government on a new exchange 
system and a trade agreement which they had no interest in.  I advised about it because 
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they would make a fortune with the kind of regime they had set up.  It worked for them 
very well. 
¶209 But when I came back, the US was spending about $400 million a year in the 
Sudan.  It was the second largest trade mission in Africa, after Egypt, by far.  And I was 
asked what I thought.  I said, “This is a terrible place, these are horrible policy makers.  It 
is really a nasty regime.  You could not get a worse regime, pull the plug.”  I am not 
saying that is why we pulled the plug.  But we did pull the plug and that regime tottered 
and fell.  There were lots of elements opposing it as well, and we got a worse regime. 
¶210 So from the point of view of American interest, and probably even from the point 
of view of Sudanese interest, I have learned my lesson.  There is always something 
worse.  Could there be something worse than Saddam?  It is pretty hard to envision that 
because I think he is about as bad as it gets.  However, at least there is the potential of 
creating something better, but the costs are terrible and very real. 
¶211 The final point I want to make is with regard to sanctions.  Sanctions did not work 
very well vis-à-vis Iraq for many reasons.  They imposed hardships on the wrong people 
so many people suffered.  It was a regime that took its money and spent it the way it 
wanted to spend it.  And, in a way, that always happens with sanctions.  It is very hard to 
fine tune sanctions.  Sanctions are a second-best policy for people who do not want to use 
force but who do not want to do nothing either.  It is particularly hard to make sanction 
regimes work when the sanctioned country has something that everybody wants, which is 
oil. 
¶212 And when your neighbors have a very strong interest in violating or abrogating 
sanctions – the Turks want oil to transit out and they wanted stuff to be imported in, 
which the Syrians could profit from doing – there were too many people with a stake in 
having the sanctions regime fail, including people who were lending to Saddam in a 
short-sighted way.  It is fine with me if the French never get paid back or if the Russians 
never get paid back.  I take some pleasure in that, in fact.  But I do not think sanctions – 
sanctions were given much time in Iraq, and they did not produce – they produced 
something: an attrition of the regime and a weakening of the regime. 
¶213 Maybe five years later the Government would have fallen just the same.  I can not 
tell you. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶214 Mr. Ambassador. 
FEISAL ISTRABADI: 
¶215 Thank you.  This is the difference between me and a trained diplomat.  Lord 
Hannay said I was ingenious.  It is much nicer than saying I was wrong.  But with all due 
respect, I am reminded of Claude Raines’ character in “Casablanca,” when he was 
shocked, shocked to discover that there was gambling going on at Rick’s place as his 
winnings were handed to him. 
¶216 To have the committee saying, “We did not say anything about Iraq, of course.  We 
did not consider how Iraq fit into all this.”  Clearly, as I think I quoted accurately that the 
report accuses the United States and the United States- led action in Iraq as having eroded 
the international order. 
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¶217 They do not use the word “order,” but it is something to that effect.  That, of 
course, assumes that there was an international order to erode.  Part of what I was saying 
is that it is not clear to me that, in fact, there is an international order to have eroded, 
since it all seems rather ad hoc to me. 
¶218 I am going to combine two questions together, and one is the obvious question 
about the American failure to – no, that is too passive – the American tolerance and 
willingness to allow Saddam Hussein to massacre hundreds of thousands of rebels in Iraq 
in 1991.  When the first President George Bush exhorted the people of Iraq to rebel, they 
did.  Fourteen of Iraq’s provinces were in rebel control in March of 1991. 
¶219 Then, Saddam asked General Schwarzkopf whether he could use helicopters, 
whether they could fly helicopters, and Schwarzkopf said, “Oh, certainly.”  And of 
course the Iraqi Air Force had helicopter gun-ships and the rebels did not, and they 
literally massacred hundreds of thousands of Iraqis in a very short period of time. 
¶220 And I will not forget Robert Pelletreau, who was President Clinton’s Assistant 
Secretary of State, for saying very publicly to the Iraqi opposition in 1992 with a 
Cheshire cat smirk on his face, “Well, the United States certainly wished the Iraqis well 
in their efforts to” – and with a dismissive gesture of his hand, in fact – “in their efforts to 
bring down the previous regime.” 
¶221 Coupled with the realization of the Iraqis that it was, in fact, the United States with 
the United Nations that enforced the most comprehensive set of sanctions aimed directly 
at a civilian population.  Here, once again, the report says that the sanctions failed.  They 
did not fail.  They succeeded most excellently because they were aimed at interrupting all 
commerce in Iraq and it worked. 
¶222 What they failed to do was to affect the conduct of the previous Government; in 
that sense they failed.  But, I remember one time being debated by somebody from the 
University of Chicago who said something about the sanctions not working, because they 
were affecting the population of Iraq.  Senator Durbin said – this was on John Calloway’s 
old show – “They are supposed to affect the civilian population.”  And that is right.  That 
is the only honest appraisal of sanctions I have ever heard.  That is what they were 
designed to do.  That is what they did. 
¶223 Why am I saying all this?  The notion that the United Nations has any legitimacy in 
Iraq may fly in Chicago and New York.  It does not in Baghdad.  I say this as one of two 
Iraqi Ambassadors to the United Nations.  There are tremendous resentments on the part 
of the Iraqis vis-à-vis the United Nations and the Oil- for-Food scandal is just part of it.  
Iraqis, I think, could probably have lived with some skimming off the top.  We are not 
unfamiliar with that concept in the Middle East, however repugnant it may be. 
¶224 But, this goes far beyond that, and the resentments are deep.  There is a friend of 
mine who did not have the good fortune of being able to leave Iraq, as my family did, 
who was an amateur artist who has painted a painting of the United Nations – of the 
Security Council members, and actually of the UN members and their view of Iraq, and 
what he has done is he has put Iraq in the middle of the table.  I actually thought that it 
was Iraq on a cross.  Having lived in the United States, I sort of was predisposed of 
thinking in these terms, I suppose, but in fact, it is Iraq on an autopsy table, and when you 
get close to the painting, that is what you see.  And you have the British very clearly with 
the, you know, sort of looking away and not wanting to look.  Kofi Annan is just a big 
mouth, no other discernible feature.  The French and the Russia speaking over here.  The 
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smaller African states in the corner.  By the way, when I asked him where the United 
States was, he said, “This entire picture is the United States.” 
¶225 So that is the Iraqi view of the United Nations.  When I sat for the first time in the 
Security Council chamber, I thought that every time the United Nations imposes 
sanctions again that painting should be brought up in the middle of the horseshoe for all 
the members to see. 
¶226 Now, as a practical matter, it may very well be that the United Nations is going to 
have to have a role in whatever comes about and I understand that.  It is one of the 
reasons I wanted to be in the United Nations, but it is not going to affect legitimacy of 
how an Iraqi Government is perceived from the perspective of the Iraqis.  Let me be very 
clear about that.  At best it will have to do with international legitimacy in a sense of a 
potential exit strategy for the United States.  Without 9/11, I do not think the United 
States would have acted in Iraq.  I do not think that the stars would have aligned properly. 
¶227 I want to address one other question, and that is about tyrannical dictatorships.  I 
understand that it is not possible for all the world’s tyrannies to be made to fall deus ex 
machina.  (There has been a lot of Latin in here.  I thought I would get in on it.)  But, the 
fact that you cannot intervene everywhere is not a reason not to have intervened in Iraq.  
Now, there may be reasons for not having intervened in Iraq, but the mere fact that you 
cannot intervene everywhere is certainly not one of them. 
¶228 The nature of the Iraqi dictatorship, however, is different in kind than the fairly 
petty dictatorships one finds in the region.  Obviously, there is a limit to what I can say, 
but I will say this: The nature of the dictatorship in Iraq had far more in common in terms 
of scope, in terms of its impact on the population of Iraq and the predisposition of the 
regime to use whatever means necessary to maintain itself in power, had far more in 
common with fascism in Europe in the ‘20s, ‘30s and the ‘40s and with Stalinism than 
with any other regime in the area, or indeed with any other regime in the world with some 
exceptions.  Once again I can not name names; I do not know if there are any reporters 
here or not. 
¶229 So, we have to understand what it is we are talking about when we talk about 
Saddam.  Saddam was no t another banana republic dictator.  He was far more than that.  
He did not kill hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.  He killed two million Iraqis out of a total 
population, when he took power, of fourteen million.  It is a startling statistic. 
¶230 I do not know what is going to happen.  I think the elections are going to occur on 
January 30th.  I can tell you this: there has been a real debate about that in Iraq, and the 
debate continues in Baghdad about whether or not elections should be held or delayed.  It 
is a sophisticated, subtle, meaningful debate going on in Baghdad, the likes of which is 
not occurring in any other foreign capital.  There is a tremendous amount of sloganeering 
about this issue in other capitals.  It is being truly debated in Iraq and that, by the way, in 
itself is a tremendous progress in Iraq. 
¶231 I do not accept that we are in civil war now, certainly not in the manner that was 
suggested.  I do not believe that Iraq is liable to ethnic unrest.  I do not accept an analysis 
of Iraq that attempts to break it into its elements, Sunnis, Arabs and Kurds, locked 
together rather unfortunately by the British. 
¶232 Iraq was a nation long before the British entered in 1917, and I do not have time to 
get into the history of Iraq.  But, even if it were not, even if it were a country put together 
through an exercise of British colonialism in the 1920s, it has been a nation for eighty-
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five years now.  When the United States was as the modern state of Iraq currently is, I do 
not think anyone would have said, “Well, it is not a real country despite the fact that at 
four score and seven years it had a civil war precisely over the issue of whether it should 
stay together or not.” 
¶233 There are foreign pressures that are clear foreign elements in the insurgency which 
drove the beginning of the insurgency.  The number of mistakes made by the occupation 
authorities in Iraq, including the very fact that an occupation was created, are 
monumental. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶234 Before we turn to Professor Wouters, I would like to offer President Bienen an 
opportunity to respond briefly to what the Ambassador said. 
HENRY BIENEN : 
¶235 I mostly agreed with what the Ambassador said, but we have a difference of 
opinion about ethical differences in Iraq, but that is not what I wanted to respond.  I want 
to put a historical footnote on one point. 
¶236 I very much agree that absent 9/11, there would have been no American 
intervention in Iraq.  The political system would not have allowed it, and I do not think 
that policymakers would have even thought to have moved in that way.  But, I do think 
that what happened in the murder of large numbers of Kurds in the north and Sunnis in 
the south made a profound impression on policymakers in the US Government. 
¶237 I was asked to come back to the Government; I was there, I went out, and I came 
back during that time.  There was a huge debate as to whether to go all the way to 
Baghdad in the beginning.  It was decided, of course, not to do so but rather to stop.  
President Bush himself was on the fence.  The generals did not want to go.  General 
Powell above all was against going; he had always had a very restrained view of 
American force.  You recall the Powell doctrine.  There also was the view that there was 
a fair chance of overthrowing Saddam without American troops.  There was concern 
about being embroiled; what did you do once you got to Baghdad, and how did you get 
out? 
¶238 All those issues were on the table, and they were discussed and debated.  When he 
did not fall and when in the tens of thousands of these helicopters just shooting people in 
the back of the head in the south and elsewhere, he murdered many Iraqis, I think I had 
made a very profound impression on a bunch of policymakers who felt guilty.  And it has 
always been said that this President Bush wanted to get even with Saddam because he 
had ordered his assassination. 
¶239 I think more psychologically profound is that the people around now, Vice 
President Cheney and other, lower level officials, felt very deeply about this policy 
decision not taken and had a lot of blood on their hands.  I myself think it was one of the 
more disgraceful periods in American foreign policy, and it certainly influenced my view 
as well – when we are doing all this mea culpa – as to how people think psychologically 
in the present about the experiences that passed. 
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¶240 I am convinced that the decision to let him fly and not to create the no-fly zones 
immediately and profoundly influenced people in this last go-round.  That is my belief 
and there is no statement to the contrary that could persuade me of the difference. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶241 Jan. 
JAN WOUTERS: 
¶242 I must say, all the questions were addressed to the gentlemen here and they have 
responded to them all, I think, in great detail. 
¶243 I do not think there was an answer to the gentleman’s question, the gentleman in 
the back who so pointedly said, if it was wrong to go to war, why is it right to stay there?  
That is a question to which I do not have an answer.  I wonder about the other 
distinguished panel members. 
¶244 I would also like to tie in with one of the observations of this morning’s keynote 
address, in which Lord Hannay mentioned the potential for regional organizations to do 
something about security and peace under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.  Lord Hannay 
rightly pointed out the weakness that is caused by the absence or the ineffective character 
of certain regional security organizations, he mentioned the Gulf, and I would like to ask 
a very naive question. 
¶245 If it is so sensitive and so difficult, given the resentment the Iraqis have for the 
United Nations, to have an option where the UN is really involved in the first place, is 
there any potential of having a kind of regional coalition that could provide some 
stabilization?  That is the question I have. 
FEISAL ISTRABADI: 
¶246 The interim government whose mandate is on the wane obviously made a decision 
that it would not accept assistance from any of Iraq’s immediate neighbors in terms of 
troops although some offers were forthcoming.  Our neighbors as a rule are not 
Luxemburg and Switzerland, and there was some concern about that.  I expect that the 
transitional government will continue in this policy, and so there are difficulties. 
¶247 One of the problems is that there have not been very many offers forthcoming for 
assistance in Iraq, in part because I think that a legal state of affairs was created whereby 
Iraq became technically occupied.  Resolution 1483 talks about the usages and customs 
of war and international humanitarian war, specifically referencing the Hague 
Convention and the Geneva Conventions. 
¶248 It is naturally, in some sense, a defeat from the jaws of victory.  It took what many 
Iraqis were willing to accept as a liberation into fact and occupation.  That is an image we 
have not been able to shake off, frankly, even through the transfer of authority and the 
reassertion of our sovereignty.  I was a part of the negotiating team that negotiated 
Resolution 1546.  We wanted the concept of reasserting sovereignty there.  I think this is 
its first use in international law. 
¶249 Still, we have an image problem, and so there have not been a tremendous number 
of offers forthcoming. 
Vol. 4:1] Preventive Use of Force: The Case of Iraq 
103 
¶250 In the end, the actual fact of the matter is – I have to say this, I believe that the 
Iraqis have had a profound sense of having been alone for twelve years in the arena with 
Saddam.  It may be that Saddam was being weakened, but the people of Iraq were being 
weakened at a greater rate than Saddam was being weakened. 
¶251 I am reminded of the story of the two hunters who stumble onto a bear.  The bear 
surprises them.  They lose their guns.  The two friends start running and the bear chases 
them.  And the one says to the other, “I do not think I can keep up running.”  And the 
other friend says, “I am not trying to outrun the bear, I am trying to outrun you.” 
¶252 Saddam was able to outrun the people of Iraq and that would have continued ad 
infinitum.  He had to go.  And I believe this was a just war or right war, although for the 
wrong reason. 
¶253 As far as why should the United States stay in: first of all, I have to say a lot of 
problems that have been created were created by well- intentioned people who did not 
really know what they were doing in Iraq, which is unfortunate.  A lot of the problems 
that have been created in Iraq have been created, frankly, by officials employed by the 
United States. 
¶254 I am a kind of semi-quasi- legal argument that there is an assumption of the duty 
here to see it through.  However, I would make an argument from the perspective, 
“Forget about my desire to have my country not fall apart into utter complete chaos.”  
¶255 I could make an argument, which I think now is quite credible and quite true, that 
from the perspective of the United States interests there, the United States cannot be seen 
to run away from Iraq.  Iraq and the Middle East are too important to the political 
strategic interest of the United States.  We are not South Vietnam of thirty years ago, and 
the environment in 2004 and 2005 is not what it was in 1975. 
¶256 There is September 11th, and if I were an American policymaker, my response to 
that question would be in the post-September 11th world, do you want to give Abu Musab 
al-Zarqawi the ability to argue that he drove the United States out of Iraq?  That is 
something for American citizens to ponder. 
¶257 As far as the negotiated settlement – by the way, I did not address this – I do not 
know how you negotiate with al-Zarqawi, and I think Mr. Luers does not think we should 
negotiate with him either.  He has to be taken on and made to meet the maker.  I agree 
that there are forces within the insurgency such that it is possible to peel away those 
groups with whom it is very possible to negotiate.  I can tell you that the interim 
government offered an amnesty, for instance, for anyone who had been in the insurgency.  
Immediately. 
¶258 This was very early on when the prime minister first took over at the beginning of 
June.  Immediately, the United States said, “That will not apply to people who killed 
Americans.”  That immediately had to put him in the position to say, “That will not apply 
to whoever killed the Iraqis either.”  Who was it going to apply to?  I agree with you that 
the solution to this must be identifying who you can have a rational conversation with 
and you who you cannot have a rational conversation with and treating those different 
groups accordingly. 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶259 I would like to give Lord Hannay an opportunity, if he wishes, to offer a brief 
comment upon what has been said, and perhaps take us back to where we began with the 
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High-Level Panel Report where the focus was on the use of force in terms of legality and 
legitimacy, and I offer the opportunity to Lord Hannay and to Mr. Luers, should they 
choose to, to offer any concluding remarks that they would like to offer following the 
remarks of our panel. 
¶260 (No response.) 
STEPHEN SAWYER: 
¶261 Now you can clap. 
¶262 (Symposium recessed at 5:30 p.m.) 
